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Slavery as Immigration?
By RHONDA V. MAGEE*
Prologue
As an African-American woman and legal scholar,1 I have long been troub-
led by the absence of sustained discourse within the legal academy on the
legacies of American chattel slavery and its multifaceted impact on contem-
porary U.S. law and policy.2 Since entering the academy, I have puzzled,
mostly in silence, over the continued absence of scholarship drawing a link
between slavery and contemporary law and policy in the areas in which I
teach. Presently, this inquiry leads me to consider the implications for immi-
gration law, and to this effort at breaking this silence.3
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. Special thanks to those who assisted
me in the research for this Essay, including research librarian John Shafer, research
assistants Craig Hawkins and Susan Jost, and the editors of the USF Law Review. I am
grateful for the comments of Gerald Neuman, Richard Delgado, Bill Ong Hing, Kevin
Johnson, Devon Carbado, participants in the USF Faculty Scholarship workshops,
participants in the Lutie A. Lytle Black Women Faculty Workshop, and especially, Asmara
M. Tekle. All remaining mistakes of fact, law, or judgment are, of course, my own.
1. For a classic treatment of the relevance of “subject position” in legal scholarship,
see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR
(1991). For a contemporary consideration of subject positionality and narrative as among
several methodologies useful to a thoroughgoing critical race approach, see Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005). For a recent elaboration on the value
of narrative methods as analogous to qualitative auto-ethnographic data, and aids in per-
sonal, holistic understanding, and transformation, see Rhonda V. Magee, Toward an Inte-
gral Critical Approach to Thinking, Talking, Writing, and Teaching About Race, 43 U.S.F. L. REV.
259 (2008).
2. Indeed, my first piece of legal scholarship focused on the case for African-Ameri-
can reparations for slavery and segregation, highlighting the failure of mainstream racial
remedies scholars to adequately consider these claims. See Rhonda V. Magee, The Master’s
Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and
Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993).
3. See JANICE MIRIKITANI, SHEDDING SILENCE: POETRY AND PROSE (1987). In her poem,
Prisons of Silence, Mirikitani writes:
From this cell of history
this mute grave
we birth our rage.
We heal our tongues.
We listen to ourselves
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Introduction
SEVERAL QUESTIONS, both conceptual and legal, have occupied
me over the past few years since I have taken up the study and teach-
ing of immigration law. As a conceptual matter, I have wondered
whether a first generation “chattel slave” was also, in some sense, an
immigrant? That is, might the involuntarily enslaved African, forcibly
brought to the United States for condemnation to a life in chattel
slavery, be more accurately considered a certain type of immigrant?
And, if so, what are the implications of those revelations for under-
standing the origins and operations of U.S. immigration law? If trans-
atlantic4 slavery was, in part, the earliest system for immigration in the
United States, what legacies of that system should scholars of immigra-
tion law recognize, and what are the implications of that history for
immigration law and policy today? That is to say, from the standpoint
of immigration law, might the chattel slavery system be more accu-
rately considered a compound institution system comprised of not
only labor and sociocultural structures, but also a state-sponsored, per-
nicious system of immigration?
This Essay is directed at two audiences within the legal academy,
recognizing the overlap, in some cases, between the two. The first is
those who teach and/or write about immigration law; the second,
those who focus on race and law. I call upon immigration law profes-
sors to study the importation systems of transatlantic slavery. As the
earliest and most egregious examples of what contemporary immigra-
tion law would classify as “forced migration immigration” into the
United States, and the system by which over one-third of the popula-
tion of the North American colonies and early states were populated
by laborers in the country’s first three centuries, these systems should
be noted among the most significant historical antecedents of con-
temporary immigration law and policy, with legacies that reverberate
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, Yasui.
We ignite the syllables of our names.
We give testimony.
We hear the bigness of our sounds freed
like many clapping hands,
thundering for reparations.
We give testimony.
Our noise is dangerous.
Id. at 8–9.
4. My focus here is on transatlantic slavery. See discussion infra Part I.
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-2\SAN204.txt unknown Seq: 3 14-JAN-10 13:47
Fall 2009] SLAVERY AS IMMIGRATION? 275
through immigration law and policy in the United States up to the
present day.
In addition, I call upon race law scholars and critical race theo-
rists to look more carefully at the importation components of the
larger system of slavery—including the infamous middle passage—as a
particularly horrific form of what contemporary historians in law and
social science are now calling forced migration immigration.5 Those
of us who study race have an obligation to more effectively understand
the connection between this component of the slave trade, historic
and contemporary battles over immigration law and policy, and the
making and remaking of persistent racial hierarchy in America.
Each of these groups of scholars must work together to enrich
our understanding of the role of race in the making of U.S. immigra-
tion policy, and the role of U.S. immigration policy in the making of
race. And each of us must confront the legacies of racism that infect
the scholarly lenses through which these subjects are traditionally
viewed. Racism rendered the enslaved victims of these systems of
forced immigration invisible. Yet, from the point of view of enslaved
people, slavery came about by the capture, kidnapping, and forcible
migration of human beings from their African villages across the At-
lantic to the colonies and later the United States. That migration,
however pernicious, significantly transformed early American culture,
and the immigration lens is an important one for understanding how
our current immigration and naturalization system reflects this his-
tory. Rather than unwittingly continue to view the matter primarily
through the lens of the racist oppressors of these early involuntary
immigrants, we should endeavor more fully to represent the experi-
ence of the enslaved forced migrants themselves and to understand
how they were not merely victims, but immigrants.
5. See Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, Tricky Magic: Blacks as Immigrants and the Paradox of
Foreignness, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 85 (1999). Innish takes up the conceptual questions and
answers them deftly in the affirmative:
The black American experience is an immigrant experience. . . . However, the
situation in which black Americans find themselves is different. The general fail-
ure of assimilation has made the black American experience unique among im-
migrant experiences in that it is an unremitting immigrant experience—an
experience of continued exclusion. Blacks are part of a de facto permanent immi-
grant class.
Id. at 85–86. This Essay expands upon the work of Inniss by making the case for incorporat-
ing the law and policy governing the importation system of chattel slavery into treatments
of the historical foundations of immigration law within immigration law scholarship and
teaching.
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Accordingly, I call upon each of these groups of scholars to en-
gage with me in a reconsideration of the historical underpinnings of
today’s immigration system, including the relevant law and policy reg-
ulating the transportation of enslaved people as part of the slavery
system. It is not my objective here to posit the slavery era as “just an-
other wave of immigration.” Instead, I want to show that while the
experience of enslaved migrants must continue to be analyzed
through the broader lens of slavery, the immigration lens is relevant
as well. Specifically, the experience of forced migration slavery,
among other things, was a singularly horrific form of immigration expe-
rience, and one which shares many of the distinctive features of immi-
gration experience, but one which ultimately has no parallel in the
experiences of other immigrant groups. Considered carefully, this sin-
gular experience can teach us much about the current system of im-
migration, its core objectives, functions, and consequences for a
society founded upon democratic principles.
My main claims here may be summarized as follows: the hun-
dreds of thousands of people of African heritage forcibly transported
to British North America under the chattel slavery system were a cer-
tain sort of immigrant; and chattel slavery was, among very many other
things, a compulsory form of immigration, the protection and regulation of
which, under federal and state law, was our nation’s first system of “immigra-
tion law.” As a consequence, the formal system that developed was in-
culcated with the notion of a permanent, quasi-citizen-worker
underclass and privileged white ethnics under naturalization law—its
legacies we can see up to the present day.
The project ultimately has two important goals: (1) to reframe
the notion of the immigrant to include the Black forced immigrant
experience under the system of chattel slavery; and (2) to reframe
immigration law to include, as relevant historical antecedents, the law
and policy of chattel slavery at both the federal and state level. This
proposed reframing has substantive implications for the study and
practice of immigration.6 First, the law and policies of transatlantic
chattel slavery should be considered as among the earliest formula-
tions of U.S. immigration law and policy, or, at the very least, centrally
important historical antecedents of contemporary immigration law.
And secondly, contemporary practitioners should examine the ways
that current policies and practices reflect the legacies of compulsory
6. There are, of course, implications for other areas of law as well, such as labor law.
See, e.g., Juan Perea, And Deliver Us from Evil: Constitutional Themes and the Perpetua-
tion of Servitude, at the Jack Pemberton Lecture on Workplace Justice (Feb. 26, 2009).
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immigration law strategies and commitments, and more effectively
link contemporary strategies of resistance to the law and policy by which
transatlantic and domestic chattel slavery were dismantled.
This proposed reframing has sociocultural implications. One of
the legacies of racial hierarchy is a tendency towards racial projects of
compartmentalization and distribution of resources by race.7 This is as
true for the production of knowledge around “the immigrant” as else-
where. That is, the notion of “the immigrant” has been elaborated
and coded in ways which render invisible the experience of early Afri-
cans forcibly brought to the United States. In fact, upon arrival these
early migrant workers underwent processes that reflect, among other
things, an important, and perhaps singular, kind of “immigrant expe-
rience.” Indeed, it is my contention that this failure of educators to
fully appreciate the immigration consequences of slavery is itself both
a product of the classical racialism of our shared past, and an agent in
the ongoing reiteration of racial subordination and privilege within
contemporary American society. In other words, thinking of Black
Americans whose ancestors were enslaved as merely descendents of
slaves, without acknowledging the migration and acculturation stories
worthy of excavation and study, transports the racism of our past into
our present, giving it new life.
Further, by both action and inaction, the United States endorsed
and legalized American transatlantic chattel slavery, engaged in it di-
rectly, and on the federal government’s behalf, by the states, and in so
doing, endorsed and legalized chattel slavery’s importation laws and
policies—making them, in effect, the first major pillar of the immigra-
tion system in the United States. In other words, transatlantic slavery
was, in significant part (though hardly exclusively), an immigration sys-
tem of a particularly reprehensible sort: a system of state-sponsored
forced migration human trafficking, endorsed by Congress, important
to the public fisc as a source of tax revenue, and aimed at fulfilling the
need for a controllable labor population in the colonies, and then in
the states, at an artificially low economic cost.
The notion of reframing the immigrant experience to include
that of those imported into this country via slavery is controversial.
Thus, after discussing the grounds for my claims, I survey the advan-
tages and disadvantages of such a reframing. I conclude that immigra-
tion law scholars should work to end what one historian referred to
7. Devon W. Carbado, Remarks at the University of San Francisco Law Review Sym-
posium, The Evolving Definition of the Immigrant Worker: The Intersection Between Em-
ployment, Labor, and Human Rights Law (Feb. 27, 2009) (notes on file with author).
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years ago as the “artificial cleavage” between slavery and immigration.
I briefly suggest some of the implications of such a change for the
study and teaching of immigration law, and for a healing reconstruc-
tion of the American narrative as a whole.
I. Slavery as Immigration
A. Transported Africans as Forced Immigrants
As seen through the lens of contemporary immigration law, Afri-
cans transported to British North America under the system of transat-
lantic slavery were in fact a certain kind of immigrant—what we would
today call a “forced migration immigrant.”8 Contemporary historians
agree that approximately ten million Africans were forcibly migrated
from West and Central Africa to colonies in the Americas.9 Compara-
tively few of these, between 400,000 and 500,000, were transported to
the North American colonies and states.10 They were transported for
sale and distribution through the complex and varied system of abject
exploitation of labor through physical and cultural transplantation
that historians refer to as chattel slavery.11 Thus, an important aspect
of this complicated system, one which we most commonly think of as
“a means of organizing society and extracting labor,”12 was its function
of enabling the involuntary, forcible, virtually permanent transporta-
tion of people from one part of the globe to another. In other words,
it was, in significant part, a system of involuntary, forced immigration.
Indeed, within the last generation, immigration historians have
taken up the call to “end the artificial cleavage” between immigration
8. See DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 5–13 (2007) (de-
fining “forced migration immigration” to include persons “trafficked” or “smuggled”).
Trafficked migrants are those “moved by deception or coercion for the purposes of ex-
ploitation.” Id. at 10. Smuggled migrants are those “moved illegally for profit.” Id. Some
analysts further distinguish smuggling as being entirely mutual. Although importation of
enslaved people under the Spanish and Portuguese systems is significant to the history of
modern-day Florida and perhaps other states, and hence, is relevant to U.S. immigration
history, my focus in the balance of this study is on the importation of enslaved people to
British North America. See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1963–1965, at 34 (1998) (discussing the Spanish establishment of a slave colony at St. Au-
gustine “dating more than fifty years before 1619, the commonly accepted beginning of
African slavery in the future United States”).
9. ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY IN
AMERICAN LIFE 61 (Harper Collins 1991).
10. Id.
11. IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN
NORTH AMERICA 2 (1998).
12. Id. at 4.
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and slavery.13 For example, Roger Daniels, in his COMING TO AMERICA:
A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE, writes
“the slave trade was one of the major means of bringing immigrants to
the New World in general, and the United States in particular.”14
Aaron Fogleman is one historian of American immigration to explic-
itly discuss the social dynamics that have led to the tendency of histori-
ans to exclude enslaved Africans among studies of early immigrants:
In the 1970s Peter H. Wood and C. Vann Woodward lamented the
exclusion of African slaves from the ranks of “immigrants.” They
attributed it to racism and the tendency of immigration historians
to begin their studies in the nineteenth century, as African immi-
gration into the United States was ending. Too often historians
have used the European model to explain immigration and the
immigrant story in American history—whatever does not fit that
model may not be understood as immigration. In my view, how-
ever, immigrants were people who came from somewhere else to
the mainland colonies or the United States (as opposed to having
been born there). The immigrant story critical to the demo-
graphic, economic, and cultural development of the United States
is an ongoing, complex, and changing tale that enlists a cast of
characters from nearly all parts of the globe. In the past generation
that view has become more accepted, as historians have given in-
creasing attention to slaves in the colonial period as forced African
immigrants.15
I refer to this tendency to exclude Blacks from treatments of U.S.
immigration history as the “no-Black” paradigm.16 It is the normal sci-
ence by which the experience of enslaved African people disappears
13. DANIELS, supra note 9, at 54–55 (cataloguing efforts to address this cleavage that R
had not, at the time of his writing, “gone far enough”).
14. Id. at 54.
15. Aaron S. Fogleman, From Slaves, Convicts, and Servants to Free Passengers: The Trans-
formation of Immigration in the Era of the American Revolution, J. AM. HIST. 43, 50 (1998).
16. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1, 10–11 (3d ed.
Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (defining paradigm and arguing that scientific practice, includ-
ing law, follows coherent traditions that seldom yield overt disagreements over fundamen-
tals, until new paradigms take hold). As Juan Perea correctly points out, “[o]mitting
important history from the narrative of civil rights history becomes extraordinarily damag-
ing, since it distorts history and contributes to the marginalization of non-Black peoples of
color.” Cf. Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of
American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (1997); accord Juan F. Perea, The Black/
White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 10 LA RAZA
L.J. 127 (1998). I suggest that the same might be said of the omission of Blacks from the
narrative of immigration history: it “becomes extraordinarily damaging, since it distorts his-
tory and contributes to the marginalization of [Blacks]” within our culture. See also Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-
White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997) (reviewing LOUISE ANN FISCH, ALL RISE: REY-
NALDO G. GARZA, THE FIRST MEXICAN AMERICAN FEDERAL JUDGE (1996)) (discussing a num-
ber of specific ways a narrow paradigm of race marginalizes those falling outside it).
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from cognition as an immigrant experience.17 Fogleman explicitly dis-
rupts this paradigm in his work by describing the immigrant popula-
tion in colonial and early America so as to include enslaved Africans
in the opening paragraph of his study of the changing character of
immigration in America prior to the war with Britain: “From the
founding of Jamestown until the Revolution, nearly three-fourths of
all immigrants to the thirteen colonies arrived in some condition of
unfreedom.”18 Even more recently, historian Paul Spickard has gone
further, naming the forced migration of Africans into America, along
with the decimation of Native Americans as “the two founding facts of
American history . . . [and] central facts in the story of American im-
migration.”19 Speaking about the early enslaved immigrants, Spickard
states that “Africans were in fact migrants, though compelled, and . . .
they have undergone processes that are in some ways very similar to
those of other immigrant groups—and in some ways they are pro-
foundly different. It is essential to see [both] the similarities (many of
which have to do with cultural processes) and the differences (which
have to do with race and power).”20 Among the essential differences
that Spickard acknowledges between forced African migrants and
other migrants is, of course, the harrowing journey across the Atlantic
on ships especially outfitted for human cargo in what became known
as “The Middle Passage.”21 The brutal circumstances of their trans-
port, and the policy of stripping enslaved people of their culture and
heritage are important distinctive features of African forced migration
that bear consideration by immigration scholars interested in contem-
porary parallels.22
Indeed, the vast number of forced migration immigrants brought
into the so called “New World,” from African nations, and the fecun-
dity of their descendants, renders the failure to consider the implica-
tions of their importation from the standpoint of immigration law
hard to justify. Historian Spickard points out that:
[M]ost U.S. historians would be surprised to learn that, in the gen-
eration before the American Revolution, between 1720 and 1760,
more African migrants came to the thirteen colonies than Euro-
pean migrants: 159,000 Africans compared to 105,000 Europeans.
17. KUHN, supra note 16, at 10–11. R
18. Fogleman, supra note 15, at 43. R
19. PAUL R. SPICKARD, ALMOST ALL ALIENS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND COLONIALISM IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND IDENTITY 62–63 (2007).
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id. at 63–65.
22. See generally Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in
Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 207 (2007).
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African American migration dominated the demography of that
era to an even greater extent than did European migration domi-
nate the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first de-
cades of the twentieth century.23
The peak period of forced migration came in the decades be-
tween the ratification of the Constitution and the cessation of the
trade by Congress some twenty years later—precisely consistent with
the power granted Congress under the Importation and Migration
Clause. During that twenty-year period of federal protection of the
slave trade, nearly 200,000 Africans were forcibly imported into
states.24 “[I]n terms of absolute numbers, more Africans than Europe-
ans crossed the Atlantic to the Americas until some time in the third
decade of the nineteenth century.”25 Indeed, over the years from 1607
until 1819, when the first official passenger lists were compiled, histor-
ical records indicate that approximately thirty-three percent of the to-
tal immigrant population arriving in the colonies and early states were
enslaved men, women, and children, presumably from West Africa.26
As changes on the world stage in the late eighteenth century led to
changes in accepted practices, forced migration of Africans fell into
disfavor on both sides of the Atlantic and the characteristics of the
immigrant population began to shift. As Fogleman summarizes:
These developments transformed an immigration primarily of
slaves, convicts, and indentured servants into one of free subjects.
By the 1820s, when the United States government began keeping
official statistics, the transformation was already so complete that it
obscured the changes that had occurred before, during, and after
the Revolution.27
With Congress’s outlawing of slavery in 1808, the U.S. govern-
ment’s protection of forced migration of Africans came to an official
end. Informally and unofficially, however, the trade continued
through the first half of the nineteenth century, and with it, the
forced migration into this country of an additional 50,000 or so Afri-
cans who would become Americans.28
23. SPICKARD, supra note 19, at 9. R
24. Id. at 68 fig.2.14.
25. Id. at 67.
26. Fogleman, supra note 15, at 44 tbl.2. The balance of the immigrant population at R
that time included four percent convicts and prisoners, seventeen percent indentured ser-
vants, and forty-six percent free persons. Id.
27. Id. at 45.
28. Although some authorities state that the last known slave ship docked in South
Carolina in 1854, others suggest that the illegal importation of enslaved Africans—in a
sense, America’s first “illegal immigrants”—continued until 1870. DANIELS, supra note 9, at R
61.
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Thus, U.S. immigration historians have reasoned that enslaved
Africans were immigrants of a specific kind. These scholars have de-
bunked the notion of an undifferentiated definition of “immigrant,”
elaborating on the term to include the experience of forced migrants,
including enslaved African peoples during the era of chattel slavery in
America, and others whose arrival from elsewhere was not voluntary,
as well as categories of migrants whose presence was less than com-
pletely so.29 Enslaved Africans were forcibly migrated immigrants
whose brutal transportation to this country was mediated and obscured
through the broader evils of the system of slavery.30 The law and pol-
icy governing their forced transportation and importation into the
early states are relevant, then, as historical antecedents to U.S. immi-
gration law and policy today. It is curious, then, that immigration law
scholars have done so little so far to incorporate these understandings
into historical overviews of immigration and contemporary immigra-
tion law texts.
B. Treatment of Chattel Slavery Within U.S. Immigration Law
History
Notwithstanding these facts and recent developments within the
scholarship on U.S. immigration history, immigration law scholars
tend to eschew considering enslaved Africans as immigrants and thus
fail to consider slavery and its law and policy as significant antecedents
of contemporary law and policy. This is true even of those immigra-
tion law scholars who have greatly advanced the project of viewing
immigration through the lens of race.31
A review of the dominant casebooks on immigration law confirms
that only one includes a brief reference to the importation systems of
29. See Fogleman, supra note 15, at 43 (discussing migrations of “slaves, convicts and R
servants” as “play[ing] a critical role in the demographic, economic, social, and cultural
development of the colonies”).
30. Many, many Africans died during the transportation process. Exactly how many is
unknown, but the number is regularly estimated as being in the millions. SPICKARD, supra
note 19, at 67. R
31. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law
in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 526,
532 (2000) (encouraging further racial critique of immigration law, but focusing only on
voluntary migration of Africans); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immi-
gration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273,
280 (1996) (discussing restrictions on immigration of Africans in federal law in the twenti-
eth century and corresponding low numbers of voluntary immigrants from Africa); Bill
Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 HOW. L.J. 237
(1994) (discussing reasons for low voluntary immigration of Africans and racial restrictions
in federal immigration law after the Civil War).
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transatlantic chattel slavery as an antecedent to U.S. immigration
law.32 None goes so far as to characterize chattel slavery as comprising
a system of forced migration immigration whose basic imperatives
helped shape our modern tendency toward racialized, exploitable im-
migrant quasi-citizen-workers. At most, the leading texts typically refer
to slavery tangentially, as part of the discussion of the origins of the
plenary powers doctrine.33
Of the most widely available treatises, only two mention “slaves” as
among the immigrants to early America.34 The National Lawyers
Guild Treatise acknowledges that enslaved people had been “im-
ported” for their labor, as subsequent immigrants would be.35 Austin
Fragomen’s IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS notes, briefly, that the
foreign nationals arriving in the United States during the country’s
first century did include slaves.36
The text whose title promises most to include a thoroughgoing
discussion of the importation systems of chattel slavery is a recent of-
fering entitled FORCED MIGRATION IMMIGRATION.37 Though focused
on contemporary forced migration law and crises, the authors de-
scribe a broad range of situations in which individuals today and
throughout history have been forced to leave their homes and travel
across international borders.38 Among these are “trafficked people,”
defined by the authors as “people who are moved by deception or
coercion for the purposes of exploitation,” and “smuggled people,”
defined as migrants “moved illegally for profit.”39
32. See T. ALEXANDER ALIENIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 159 (6th ed. 2007) (“Not all came of their own free will. . . . Beginning in Virginia
in 1619, 350,000 slaves were brought from Africa until the end of the slave trade in 1807.”
(citation omitted)); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 13–16 (5th ed. 2009) (no mention of slavery in brief histori-
cal overview excerpted from “the leading immigration law treatise”).
33. See, e.g., ALIENIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 202–03; LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra R
note 32, at 116–18 (citing debate over the relevance of the Importation and Migration R
Clause to Congressional power to regulate immigration).
34. See 1 NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
DEFENSE § 2:2 (3d ed. 2009) (“Immigrants arrived in North America as slaves and landown-
ers, indentured servants and merchants, seekers of religious freedom and seekers of for-
tune,” and noting that following the ending of the slave trade in the 1850s, “immigrants
were imported for specific jobs.”) [hereinafter NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT]; see also 1 AUSTIN T.
FRAGOMEN, JR., ALFRED J. DEL REY, JR. & SAM BERNSEN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS
(2009) [hereinafter FRAGOMEN, ET AL.].
35. NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT, supra note 34, § 2:2. R
36. FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 34, § 1:2. R
37. See generally MARTIN ET AL., supra note 8. R
38. Id. at 1–32.
39. Id. at 10.
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The reader of FORCED MIGRATION IMMIGRATION who is interested
in the connection between the ancient system of chattel slavery and
these more contemporary forms is not entirely disappointed. The au-
thors state a connection in the first chapter: “Clearly, the Atlantic slave
trade, which brought more than 10 million captured and enslaved
Africans to the Americas, constituted forced migration.”40 Apart from
that single sentence, however, the authors appear to leave chattel slav-
ery and its consequences for American forced migration immigration
law and policy in the dim reaches of American legal history. The fail-
ure to consider chattel slavery and its implications more thoroughly
here and elsewhere in the most readily available immigration law texts
is inconsistent not only with the trends in contemporary general im-
migration history described earlier, but it also fails to cohere with the
definition of “forced migration immigration” currently in use under
contemporary immigration law.
In short, the major casebooks and treatises in immigration law
presently fail to treat the forcible importation and migration systems
of American chattel slavery as a significant aspect of, or even impor-
tant antecedent to, our early immigration history, law, and policy.
Thus, here as elsewhere in contemporary law, the legal history of slav-
ery and the experience and implications of enslaved people under the
law are under-acknowledged. As the appearance of the text by David
Martin and others might suggest, this “Black out” is all the more sur-
prising given the recognition increasingly given to the concept of
forced migration immigration in contemporary law.
C. Forced Migration Immigration in Contemporary Law
Contemporary immigration law in the United States recognizes,
but does not endorse, forced migration immigration or slavery. The
law recognizes forced migration immigration, including trafficking in
persons and slavery, as a grounds for affirmative remedy and relief in
the form of a recently adopted nonimmigrant visa under Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(T)(ii) (2000)
(known as the T-Visa).41
40. Id. at 11.
41. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)15(T)(ii) (2000) (“T” nonim-
migrant visa); Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a), (b)(1), (3),
(21)–(22) (2000):
(a) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are to combat trafficking in persons, a contem-
porary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and
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The T-Visa provision provides a firm basis in contemporary immi-
gration law for the argument that the African-heritage people forcibly
transported into the United States under the system of chattel slavery
were compulsory immigrants in a sense compatible with the use of the
term by immigration scholars and practitioners today. As noted above,
the recent emergence of a casebook devoted to the various forms of
forced migration immigration suggests the growing interest among le-
gal scholars in modern practices that echo the ancient system of chat-
tel slavery.42
D. Legal Scholarship on the Intersection of Chattel Slavery and
Immigration Law
If, as immigration law scholars have shown, transatlantic chattel
slavery is and was a form of immigration, and therefore the state laws
governing the importation and migration of enslaved people should
be considered part of the body of law we call “immigration law,” what
follows from that? I argue that the law and policy which permitted the
states to operate systems of slavery should be reconceived of as impor-




(1) As the 21st century begins, the degrading institution of slavery con-
tinues throughout the world. Trafficking in persons is a modern form of
slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today. At least 700,000
persons annually, primarily women and children, are trafficked within or
across international borders. Approximately 50,000 women and children
are trafficked into the United States each year.
. . . .
(3) Trafficking of persons is not limited to the sex industry. This growing
transnational crime also includes forced labor and involves significant vio-
lations of labor, public health, and human rights standards worldwide.
. . . .
(21) Trafficking of persons is an evil requiring concerted and vigorous
action by countries of origin, transit or destination, and by international
organizations.
(22) One of the founding documents of the United States, the Declara-
tion of Independence, recognizes the inherent dignity and worth of all
people. It states that all men are created equal and that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. The right to be free from
slavery and involuntary servitude is among those unalienable rights. Ac-
knowledging this fact, the United States outlawed slavery and involuntary
servitude in 1865, recognizing them as evil institutions that must be
abolished.
Trafficking Victims Protection Act §§ 7101(a), (b)(1), (3), (21)–(22).
42. See generally MARTIN ET AL., supra note 8. R
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tant elements of our first federal law and policy regarding immigration,
and that failure to do so amounts to a “no-Black” paradigm within
immigration law that cannot stand. Consider the legal scholarship
that provides a sound basis for a reconsideration of this “no-Black”
paradigm and incorporating slavery as forced migration immigration
within studies of the underpinnings of U.S. immigration law.
As Mary Bilder has persuasively argued, two great systems of im-
ported and bound labor lie at the heart of the call for a conceptual
reconsideration of the origins of American immigration (and labor)
policies.43 These systems are chattel slavery and indentured servi-
tude.44 Each of these systems is under-theorized in immigration law.45
The law governing each has implications for contemporary immigra-
43. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Arti-
cles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 750 (1996).
44. Id. Clearly, these systems represent very different mechanisms for securing a simi-
lar purpose: the importation of laborers to work in the United States. The conditions,
abuses, terms, and existential implications of the two distinct categories are of ongoing
importance. Indentured servitude was the more or less voluntary system by which the vast
majority of Europeans entered the United States from the founding generations through
about 1820, and were placed under contract to work, generally for four, five, or seven
years, to pay the cost of their passage. Recent historians estimate that one-half to two-thirds
of all “white” immigrants into the country from the 1630s to the War for Independence
came under indenture—numbering some 600,000 men and women. Once their indenture
was completed, however, their status changed, and these formerly bound white laborers
were free, after 1790, to become naturalized U.S. citizens. Id. at 753–54.
Slavery, on the other hand, as we all know, was entirely involuntary and represented a
qualitatively different order of socially constructed dehumanization by fusing bound la-
borer status, or slave status, with race, and the development of a black sub-humanity ideol-
ogy to sustain it. Thus, slavery degenerated, over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
into what Ralph Waldo Emerson saw it to be in his own lifetime: “an institution for con-
verting men into monkeys.” RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 39 (William H. Gilman ed., New American Library 2003) (1965) (emphasis ad-
ded). Not until the Civil War and the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments—
notably the thirteenth and fourteenth—was slavery barred. Only then were African Ameri-
cans unambiguously deemed “persons” and, after 1870, permitted to naturalize as U.S.
citizens. So, as a matter of socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional consequence, the two
systems must be understood as separate and distinct.
The differential status assigned to “slave” and “indentured servant” was made virtually
permanent by the very different terms and conditions that characterized enslaved versus
indentured people. Indeed, the complete human debasement that was slavery during the
nineteenth century continues to fuel calls for its characterization as an official “crime
against humanity”—a crime which fuels a call for redress via payment of restitution and
reparations to descents of slaves in Western nations, and to the African countries whose
indigenous population suffered from the trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. These controversial aspects of our complicated, and in many ways shameful, history
have for centuries clouded our capacity to see those aspects of chattel slavery (and inden-
tured servitude) that mark their incontrovertible contributions to immigration history, law,
and public policy.
45. Bilder, supra note 43, at 747. R
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tion law and policy, and more must be written about the importance
of indentured servitude and other forms of bonded labor as anteced-
ents to modern immigration law. My focus here is on the relevant le-
gal scholarship relating to slavery.
As Bilder has shown, slavery was not merely a degrading, exploita-
tive economic system, legal status assignment, and existential condi-
tion. Rather, it was also a means of transporting men and women from
Africa and the diaspora into the colonies and slave-importing south-
ern states.46 In other words, slavery was “both a labor relationship and
a way of moving people” from one national landscape to another.47
Enslaved people were “simultaneously individuals who increased pop-
ulation and a pool for bound labor.”48
In another important contribution, Walter Berns focuses on the
protection slavery received under the U.S. Constitution, particularly in
clauses limiting Congressional authority to interfere with the trade.49
The Constitution’s explicit protections for the forced migrations of
Africans through the system of slavery are commonly listed among the
“compromises” between disputing regions and factions necessary to
forming the union. Seldom are they discussed as central, if not cru-
cial, to the forced migration system’s smooth functioning. Specifically,
the most important provision for our purposes is found at Article I,
section nine, the Migration and Importation Clause. Under that
Clause:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and
eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person.50
This Clause provides constitutional protection of the forced im-
portation of Africans by barring Congress from exercising its powers
to prohibit the “Migration and Importation” of such persons until
1808. In so doing, it provides us the constitutional law governing the
46. At the time of the signing of the ratification of the Constitution, only South Caro-
lina and Georgia were engaged in the importation of slaves from Africa. Walter Berns, The
Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 198, 200 (1968).
47. Bilder, supra note 43, at 761. R
48. Id.
49. Berns, supra note 46, at 200. R
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. The importation and migration of Africans for what
was very likely slave labor had been ongoing since 1619 when the first continuous British
colony was established at Jamestown, Virginia, and perhaps a century earlier in the Spanish
colonies of present-day Florida. DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL
OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 124 (2006).
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importation of persons into the country. Most scholars agree that this
phrase was originally intended to pertain to the forced migration of
enslaved Africans.51 Further, Article I, section nine explicitly permits
Congress to collect taxes on the importation of enslaved persons, al-
though Congress apparently never did so, preferring instead to raise
revenue on enslaved persons indirectly—through the federal taxes on
real property.52 In this way, Congress endorsed slavery as federal gov-
ernment policy and an important revenue generating source for the
young nation.
It is important to consider the role of the Founders in setting the
course for immigration law and policy during their generation, and
beyond. In the Migration and Importation Clause at Article I, section
nine, clause one, note the use of the word “Persons,” and the drafters’
decision not to mention slavery expressly. The phrasing assuaged the
concerns of some who refused to permit the Constitution to acknowl-
edge the right to property in persons, but also gave rise to arguments
that, in using the word “Persons,” the drafters could not have been
referring to enslaved people. On its face, this Clause involves a limita-
tion of whatever powers the national legislative body might possess to
regulate, or even prohibit, the “importation” of “such Persons as any
of the States” might admit. Since the founding, its relationship to
Congress’s power to regulate either slavery or, considered separately,
immigration, has been contested.53
However, historical records confirm that the clause was aimed to
serve as a limitation on Congress’s power to regulate slavery. Given
slavery’s function as a system of immigration, it might fairly be argued
that this clause reflects a constitutional limitation on Congress’s
power to regulate this form of immigration for some twenty years, and
hence, an endorsement of the system by the Founders. Nevertheless,
the history of the Supreme Court’s treatment of this Clause confirms
that since “slaves” were a form of commerce, and immigrants could
not be, this Clause had “nothing to do” with immigration.54
51. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1878 (1993); Bilder, supra note 43, at 784; Berns, supra note 46, at R
199.
52. ERIK M. JENSEN, THE TAXING POWER 172–73 (2005).
53. See generally Berns, supra note 46. R
54. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); see also In re Ah Fong,
1 F. Cas. 213, 216 (1874) (“[W]e cannot shut our eyes to the fact that much which was
formerly said upon the power of the state [to exclude any person it may deem dangerous
to its citizens asserted by Taney in the Passenger Cases] in this respect, grew out of the
necessity which the southern states, in which the institution of slavery existed, felt of ex-
cluding free negroes from their limits.”).
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Considered today, entire lines of case law that might be said to
bear on this matter are problematic. They are not only anachronistic
but morally reprehensible. Thus, I argue that modern courts and com-
mentators must acknowledge them as such—as relics of state-spon-
sored white supremacy that we have, as a nation, thoroughly
disavowed—and endorse interpretations of these federal provisions in
light of their objective consequences. Unarguably, these provisions
protect the business, practice, and policy of importing Africans from
their home countries into the United States, under circumstances that
would today be considered state-sponsored forced migration immigra-
tion. Hence, they are historical antecedents of modern immigration
law and policy.
Walter Berns’ analysis details the battle over the meaning of this
Clause, which played out in the courts, Congress, and state legislatures
over the better part of the nineteenth century.55 He describes the im-
portant stakes that shaped the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this
Clause and the corresponding reach of Congressional power over im-
migration. He concludes that the unsettled and bitter contests con-
cerning the respective powers of the federal branches over the states’
rights to regulate slavery prohibited the development of comprehen-
sive immigration law until the settlement of these issues through the
Civil War.56
Another clause is important to a full understanding of the protec-
tions that the drafters granted the slave trade in the Constitution. The
Constitution’s Article V provides:
[N]o Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thou-
sand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first
and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article . . . .57
Read, as it must be, in conjunction with Article I, section nine,
the Migration and Importation Clause, this provision makes plain the
Founders’ intent to support and protect slavery, and operates as well
as an important founding federal law respecting forced migration im-
migration into the United States.
The final important law in this trilogy of federal regulation of
forced migration immigration is the Act by Congress making good on
55. Berns, supra note 46, at 199–228. R
56. Neuman, supra note 51, at 1688. R
57. U.S. CONST. art. V. In addition to these important provisions, the various other
slavery compromises provide additional indication of the Congress’s commitment to slav-
ery, including the three-fifths clause and the fugitive slave clause.
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the threat implied by the enactment of Article I, section nine.58 As
foreshadowed above, in March 1807, Congress under President Jeffer-
son enacted a law outlawing the importation of African slaves, to take
effect on January 1, 1808. With this law, Congress withdrew its support
of the forcible transatlantic migration of Africans and their transporta-
tion to the United States for sale. Although some 50,000 additional
Africans were imported in the years between 1808 and the start of the
Civil War, this law signaled, at least, Congress’s intent to bar the trans-
atlantic migration system of slavery—a system so odious that its com-
mon name was never used in the Constitution itself.59 Nevertheless,
historians report that this law was under-enforced, which resulted in
the continuation of international forced migration under even more
ignoble means, including illegal smuggling.
In 1865,60 Congress finally disavowed slavery as direct or indirect
U.S. policy in the Thirteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Amend-
ment reads:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except for punishment
of a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the Unites States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.61
In this way, Congress for the first time explicitly disavowed not
only the formal transatlantic trade in slavery, but also the internal (or
intracontinental) version, and with it, the forced migrations and dis-
placements that had made the illegal transatlantic forced immigra-
tions and trading in slavery a viable (and many say, tacitly permitted)
option between the time of the passage of the 1808 Act and the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
58. Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves Into Any Part or Place Within the Juris-
diction of the United States, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
59. Berns, supra note 46, at 213. Indeed, some consider the importation of Africans R
for enslavement to be an example of systemic illegal immigration. DANIELS, supra note 9, at R
63.
60. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was proposed on January
31, 1865, and ratified on December 6, 1865. See TERRY L. JORDAN, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
AND FASCINATING FACTS ABOUT IT 49 (2003). It was followed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which was proposed on June 13, 1866, and ratified on July 9, 1868, and the Fifteenth
Amendment (granting Blacks the right to vote), which was proposed on February 26, 1869,
and ratified on February 3, 1870. Id. at 49–50.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gave Con-
gress the power to enforce this Amendment by appropriate legislation. In this connection,
it is notable that although the Amendment was passed by two-thirds of the states in 1865,
southern states often took quite a while to follow suit. Mississippi, for example, did not
ratify the Thirteenth Amendment until 1995.
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My purpose has been to identify the key pieces of legal scholar-
ship that lay a strong foundation for arguing that the importation sys-
tem of slavery was a system of government-sponsored (and ultimately
federal government-sponsored) immigration. To summarize, slavery
included: (1) the systematic forcible importation of people from vari-
ous nations, primarily in Africa, into the colonies, territories, and
later, various states (2) under the explicit protection of the U.S. Con-
stitution. Thus, it may be said that, using both active and passive law
and policy, the state and federal governments concurrently regulated
what we might call early immigration law of slavery. This was so from
the founding in 1787 until 1865, when Congress enacted the Thir-
teenth Amendment, an assumption of Congressional authority over
the right to regulate slavery which was ratified in 1876 by the Supreme
Court’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction over immigration law to Con-
gress in Henderson v. New York.62
In short, the myth of an unregulated first one hundred years of
federal immigration law depends on the embrace of certain fictions.
Among these: that enslaved people were not immigrants; and that the
constitutional and federal laws protecting slavery, beginning with the
slavery compromises in the constitution, were not forms of immigra-
tion law. These fictions are born of the legal, ideological, epistemolog-
ical, and ontological imperatives of slavery. They are fictions that have
played an important role in the processes by which slavery and immi-
gration have themselves operated as technologies of racial and citizen-
ship formation, and of racially structured subordination.63 Now
consider whether good reasons argue for perpetuating these myths.
II. Arguments Against Considering Slavery-Related
Importation and Migration Law as Immigration Law
In his seminal article, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776–1875),64 Professor Gerald Neuman identifies state and federal
enactments prohibiting the importation of African slaves as among
the laws that might be considered “lost” immigration laws. Professor
Neuman briefly notes several factors for and against considering such
62. Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (granting Congress’s exclusive
powers to regulate immigration as existing under the Commerce Clause).
63. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (1994).
64. Neuman, supra note 51, at 1878–80. R
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laws “immigration-related.”65 His arguments provide a good place to
begin a new analysis of this question.
A. Professor Neuman and the Reframing Question
The key factors identified by Professor Neuman as militating
against reframing immigration law to place slavery at its origin in-
clude: (1) that slavery was involuntary; (2) that enslaved people were
deemed less than fully human; and (3) the concern that viewing slav-
ery as immigration may be euphemistic.
1. Slavery Was Involuntary
The first factor that Professor Neuman identifies as counseling
against including slavery-related laws under the rubric of immigration
is that slavery was involuntary. Consequently, immigration law scholars
may be uncomfortable with the notion that slavery should be consid-
ered within the field most often dedicated to voluntary forms of mi-
gration across borders. Instead, the thinking goes, despite the obvious
fact that people were permanently transported as part of slavery, it was
an entirely separate and distinct system from what would become our
immigration system.
Immigration scholars are not alone in this preference for an ex-
ceptionalist approach to slavery. Lawyers and lay people of all back-
grounds tend similarly to express a lack of interest, if not outright
confusion, when asked to consider the two together.
Moreover, African Americans especially may chafe at the compar-
ison. Indeed, “my people were brought here in chains,” is a phrase
often uttered by Black students in their earliest critiques of the roman-
ticized narrative of America as a welcoming “nation of immigrants.”
Most Blacks who entered the country during the founding centuries
were “brought here in chains,” having been captured and sold, often
by Africans from competing tribes, into slavery. For many Blacks and
their sympathizers, the notion of considering slavery as a form of im-
migration seems like an inappropriate comparison.
But as Professor Neuman and David Martin have shown, modern
immigration laws apply to involuntary as well as voluntary migration.66
Indeed, “forced migration immigration” has evolved as a distinct area
of conduct, universally banned, but properly considered under the
65. Id. at 1837 n.18.
66. Id.; see also MARTIN ET AL., supra note 8 and accompanying text. R
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rubric of immigration law.67 The mere fact that slavery was an involun-
tary condition, then, is no longer a sound basis for failing to incorpo-
rate laws governing the importation of enslaved persons into the body
of law analyzed by students and scholars of immigration as immigra-
tion law.
2. Enslaved “Immigrants” as Less than Fully Human
Classical racialism68 provided the pseudoscientific basis for slav-
ery. By dividing humankind into a handful of categories and ranking
the categories in order of Eurocentric values and features, early slave-
holding societies like the colonies and original states were able to ra-
tionalize the contradictions between natural and “inalienable” rights
and a systematized denial of those rights to categories of men and
women.69 Scientific understanding has evolved to reveal the lack of a
basis for the notion of race, let alone the notion that Blacks were “not
fully human” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Neverthe-
less, some would argue that since early lawmakers did hold such views,
the laws they made to regulate the slave trade in all relevant respects
are wholly distinct from the laws relating to the migration and natural-
ization of those recognized at the time as fully human beings.
However, at least one well-known U.S. history scholar has “[de-
plored the] artificial cleavage between black history and immigration
history.”70 Indeed, such a cleavage can be seen as an important and
still-potent legacy of the thought system that provided the basis for
slavery. The persistence and continued appeal of this cleavage, and
the racism beneath it, are, in fact, chief among the ways the legacies of
slavery and white supremacy continue to operate amidst semi-con-
scious cultural denial and learned amnesia.
I cannot put aside my own moral condemnation of this aspect of
the system of slavery and its legal justification—the assignment of
human beings imported for profit from Africa into categories of
“lesser” human beings or animals. This was a sophisticated and widely
67. Neuman, supra note 51, at 1837 n.18 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219–20 R
(1982); D’Agostino v. Sahli, 230 F.2d 668, 670–71 (5th Cir. 1956)); see, e.g., MARTIN ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 10–11 (defining forced migration to include both “smuggled” and “traf- R
ficked” people).
68. See, e.g., Ronald S. Sullivan, Jr., Classical Racialism, Justice Story and Margaret Mor-
gan’s Journey From Freedom to Slavery: The Story of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, in RACE LAW STORIES
59, 73 (2008).
69. See id. at 73–86 (describing classical racialism and its justificatory role in American
political life).
70. Neuman, supra note 51, at 1837 n.18. R
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accepted practice, but it was wrong. It was a lie questioned by some at
the time, but ultimately accepted by the majority. The practice of such
systematic assignment of human beings as sub-persons presupposes
the social, legal, and political construction of elaborate systems of
epistemological (prescribing norms for cognition) and ontological
(providing norms for meaning and value) discourses and trainings
based on ignorance, exaggerations, lies, and silence.71 The establish-
ment and maintenance of what W.E.B. DuBois called “the color
line”72 required, in our early history as it does to this day, countless
misconceptions and deceptions. Amnesia and silence about these de-
ceptions continue to influence law and public policy in the United
States today. The ongoing assignment of slavery into a separate, com-
pletely distinct, and wholly exceptional system is an important aspect
of the epistemological and ontological systems that perpetuate the lie
that classical racialism and racism, historically and in the present day,
has some grounding in fact, that white supremacy is or was supported
by legitimate rationale.
3. Is Viewing Slavery as Immigration Euphemistic?
For some critics, viewing slavery as immigration minimizes the
singularity of American chattel slavery. To these critics, any considera-
tion of slavery as a form of immigration perpetuates an unacceptable
euphemism.
Admittedly, to conceptualize these experiences as immigration—
even if clearly “forced migration immigration”—runs some risk of
minimizing its singularity. But it need not do so. To the contrary, it
underscores the ways in which the particular immigration experience
of African Americans transported via slavery was a singular immigration
experience. This opens the door to new conversations about the simi-
larities and differences between the experiences of African Americans
and others who arrived in this country, or were forcibly “brought in”
via conquest. We can, and I believe we must, understand the different
71. See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 11 (2001) (“The Racial Contract is
that set of formal or informal agreements or meta-agreements between one set of humans
defined by a shifting set of ‘racial’ criteria as ‘white’ and ‘coextensive (making due allow-
ance for gender differentiation) with the class of full persons,’ to describe another subset
of humans as ‘nonwhite’ and of a different and inferior moral status, subpersons, so that
they have a subordinate civil standing in the white or white-ruled polities.” The “general
purpose of the Contract is always the differential privileging of the whites as a group with
respect to the nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources,
and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them.”).
72. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 40 (1903) (“The problem of the Twen-
tieth Century is the problem of the color-line.”).
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consequences of forced immigration to one legally assigned the status
of “slave” (an assignment into a system Congress itself has called
“evil”73) when compared to the consequences of legal assignment into
the other available statuses—“native,” “indentured servant,” or “free
person.”
B. The Technical Legal Case for Characterizing Slavery Law as
Immigration Law
Walter Berns and Mary Bilder have each conducted substantial
analyses of the technical, textual arguments regarding the Constitu-
tional law applicable to govern the great debates over the immigration
and the migration of enslaved people.74 Berns focuses on the Migra-
tion and Importation Clause, Article I, section nine, and argues per-
suasively that neither legislative intent nor consensus political
objectives make clear any plausible consensus understanding regard-
ing the availability of the Clause to permit Congress to regulate slav-
ery.75 He shows that the intent of the drafters regarding the full scope
and reach of the Migration and Importation Clause is far from ascer-
tainable by the surviving legislative history or other contemporaneous
documents, and the comments and interpretations of the drafters
themselves seemed to shift radically over time. As the debate over the
future of slavery within the slave states reached a fever pitch in the
years following cessation of the trade in 1808, defenders of slavery
found less and less to be embarrassed about in the institution, and
correspondingly less evidence of previous Congressional intent to per-
mit the regulation of slavery using the Migration and Importation
Clause.76 Given the historical debate over the meaning of this Clause,
many might be unpersuaded that the Clause represents the Founders’
endorsement of slavery as a labor importation system. However, as
Bilder suggests, the connection between this Clause, slavery, and im-
migration exists as an historical fact.77
Bilder’s analysis focuses on the dominant explanations for the
“century-long struggle” over the authority to regulate immigration,
finding that they fail to focus adequately on the imperatives of a politi-
cal economy built on slavery and indentured servitude.78 She argues
73. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)15(T)(ii)(b)(21) (2000).
74. Berns, supra note 46; Bilder, supra note 43. R
75. Berns, supra note 46 passim. R
76. Berns, supra note 46, at 212. R
77. Bilder, supra note 43, at 784–87. R
78. Id. at 747.
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that the long struggle may be explained by the Constitution’s failure
to identify immigration as one of the areas subject to Congress’s law-
making discretion.79 For Bilder, slavery and indentured servitude ex-
ert undue influence over the Court’s decisions regarding the
intersection of immigration with the Commerce Clause. She demon-
strates that immigration, commerce, and chattel slavery were con-
nected “less by analogy and general influence” than as “an integral
historical factor” explaining the development of these areas within the
doctrine.80 In careful detail, she shows how the struggle to define im-
migrants as either persons or articles of commerce became increas-
ingly bound up with the questions of federalism animating the debate
over Congress’s powers to regulate either slavery or the immigration
of whites and free Blacks.81 Bilder demonstrates persuasively that the
real reason for the centuries-long debate over whether people were
“articles of commerce,” and therefore whether the businesses engaged
in importing these articles were engaged in commerce subject to Con-
gressional regulation under the Commerce Clause (as federal immi-
gration law and policy, or otherwise), was the risk posed to slavery by
the possibility of an affirmative answer to these questions.82 Assuming
that today immigration law has no interest in adhering to the ratio-
nales that protected chattel slavery, little reason exists to prefer inter-
pretations of these laws and policies developed with those objectives
in mind.
C. A Doctrinal Coherence Argument
Reorienting immigration law and policy from the standpoint of
slavery would amount to a sea change within immigration law scholar-
ship, but one that is highly desirable.
To begin, immigration law is about the movement and migration
of people, and the law’s role in its regulation and restriction. From
that standpoint, the aspects of chattel slavery that bear on the move-
79. Id.
80. Id. at 746 n.7 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 792–824; see also Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633
(2005).
82. See Bilder, supra note 43, at 807–08 (noting that the issue of whether persons were R
“articles of commerce” subject to regulation had become inextricably bound to percep-
tions of distinctions between “persons” and black slaves, and discussing Groves v. Slaughter,
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841), as an example involving a seller of enslaved peoples’ rights to
collect on a defaulted note for their purchase, and ultimately raising the question whether
slaves were “articles of commerce,” the transportation of which could be regulated by
Congress).
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ment of enslaved people into the territory that became the United
States are by definition the subject of immigration law. Failure to in-
clude the law of slavery as an antecedent to present-day U.S. immigra-
tion law and policy, then, is simply unsound. Indeed, the ongoing
failure to adequately locate the law of slavery as among immigration-
related law, providing shape to the understanding of immigration in
the early historical period, represents a miseducation about the rele-
vant foundational law. Scholars should no longer be forgiven for stat-
ing that “[a]t the Founding, there was essentially no federal
immigration policy.”83 We should be teaching and training immigra-
tion lawyers who have a more nuanced understanding of the relevant
constitutional compromises that gave rise to the current law and pol-
icy to assist students and practitioners in better understanding the
challenges they face today.
For example, if we take as a given that forced migration immigra-
tion was our primary immigration system of choice for the country’s
first one hundred years, it follows that our immigration law and policy
originated out of and thus very likely reflects at least some of the ratio-
nales, conflicting motivations, and political imperatives of chattel slav-
ery. For example, we know that like slavery, the U.S. immigration law
that officially emerged as a federally regulated system in the post-slav-
ery era was founded upon classical racialism and the related commit-
ments to racialized economic, labor relations, and politics which
dominated the Congress from the founding and well into the nine-
teenth century.84 Those original commitments exert more than a little
influence over the system operating today.
We live in an era that demands clarification of that influence.
Lawmakers, from the Oval Office on down, seem perpetually engaged
in efforts to address aspects of the current system deemed by a broad
spectrum of analysts and observers to be “broken.”85 Criticisms of our
current system include those focused on low- and un-skilled labor. A
better understanding of the current system demands a closer consid-
eration of how we got here. As will be seen, slavery was the most signif-
icant driver of those factors upon which the development of ideas
about immigration in the new world came so heavily to depend. For
83. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary
Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
84. See J.E. CAIRNES, M.A., THE SLAVE POWER: ITS CHARACTER, CAREER, AND PROBABLE
DESIGNS: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE REAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE AMERICAN CON-
TEST (1862).
85. Julia Preston, White House Moves to Ease Guest Worker Program, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/washington/07immig.html.
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scholars and policymakers interested in meaningful and effective re-
form, the implications of identifying slavery as the foundation of key
components of the modern immigration system in the United States
are profound.
First, analyzing slavery as immigration—and, more specifically, as
forced migration immigration—centers the demand of capital for off-
market labor as perhaps the most important of all shapers of immigra-
tion policy in U.S. history.86 Despite the importance of labor-based
immigration to the powerhouse industries within our economy, and
its potentially controversial implication for domestic labor interests,
Congress has failed to develop labor-based immigration policies in a
systematic and reliably accountable manner. This analysis helps to
clarify the reason why, by highlighting under-analyzed aspects of the
underlying policy debates to wit, the irresolvable conflict between
popular demands for protection of domestic labor interests and the
less obvious but regnant demands of capital for a continuing supply of
off-market labor in immigration policy debates and reform proposals.
Secondly, viewing slavery as immigration promotes a more thor-
ough consideration of how the experiences of enslaved and free
“noncitizen” Blacks shaped the development of immigration policy in
the founding generations. The experiences of “free” and enslaved
Blacks as immigrants and as present and future candidates for citizen-
ship in the slavery and post-slavery eras yield important insights about
the roots of the social and cultural construction of “noncitizens” and
“quasi-citizens” reflected in contemporary political discourse and cul-
ture. A better understanding of the role of Blacks in our antebellum
political history promotes a richer understanding of the role quasi-
citizens and their ambiguous political and status claims continue to
play in shaping immigration law in the United States today.87
Finally, viewing immigration as a function of slavery reveals an
important irony: that with respect to immigration, slavery—our ra-
cially based forced migration system—laid a foundation for both a ra-
cially segmented, labor-based immigration system, and a racially
diverse (even if racially hierarchical) “nation of immigrants”—legacies
which the Founders may not have set out to leave, but which are
86. In some ways, this is an obvious point. As Samuel Gompers, one of the early Presi-
dents of the American Federation of Labor commented in the late nineteenth century,
reportedly said: “We immediately realized that immigration is, in its fundamental aspects, a
labor problem.” VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION POLICY AND AMERICAN UNIONISM: RE-
ALITY CHECK (2004).
87. See also Inniss, supra note 5, at 100 (referring to Blacks in America as permanent R
“quasi-aliens”).
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among our history’s most pernicious and most precious gifts to civili-
zation. As we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, grap-
pling with such ironies, and integrating new, more nuanced narratives
of understanding into our national discourses may become central
projects in the re-articulation of American history that is the mark of a
truly reconstructed America.
D. A Sociology of Knowledge Argument
The sociology of knowledge is the study of the relationship be-
tween human thought and the social context in which it arises, and
the effects prevailing ideas have on society.88 Critical Race theory, a
sociology of knowledge project focused on the relationship between
legal thought and the elements of racism in the social context within
which it arises, operates from the assumption that race has played a
central, organizing role in American law and policy, including its pro-
duction of categories of knowledge and related rules and regula-
tions.89 From a Critical Race theory perspective, immigration and race
are bound together and have been and will be. Nevertheless, we do
what we can to ameliorate or to correct the errors of our racialist-
bound past.90 Indeed, a leading scholar of immigration and Critical
Race theory has argued that “[u]ltimately, immigration scholars face
the daunting challenge of ensuring the removal of racial discrimina-
tion’s taint on the development of immigration law and policy.”91 So
the issue from this perspective may well be less whether to re-character-
ize slavery as a form of immigration, but how to do so in a way that
does not replicate patterns of marginalization and erasure—i.e., epis-
temological violence—in the act of reframing these subordinated
groups’ experiences. Despite the troubling aspects of the considera-
tion of slavery as a form of immigration discussed above, the failure to
understand the Black experience of state-sponsored enslavement as
one sort of immigration experience (albeit a horrific one), poses a
number of risks to justice, when viewed from an anti-subordination
88. PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
1–3 (1966); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION 22, 218 (1961).
89. See generally KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363
(1992).
90. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The End of Racism, and Other Fables, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 1992 (quoting Derrick Bell on the importance of struggling against anti-Black racism,
despite the unlikely chance of success).
91. Johnson, supra note 31, at 526. R
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theory perspective, and to immigration law and policy, that are at least
as troubling.
With regard to the equality and anti-subordination agenda,92 at
least two consequences follow. First, failing to see slavery as immigra-
tion furthers the construction of “the immigrant” as “white”—or at
least, not Black (in a white-over-Black binary racial order where
“Black” is a stand in for the perennial Other). Others have noted the
“white norm” in the prevailing immigration law narratives of the
past—i.e., the tendency to view every immigration experience
through the prism of the experience of white Europeans, who are
taken as the model or norm.93
Second, and related, it contributes to the self-identity among
Blacks, and the Other-identity among non-Blacks, of the Black as per-
petually alienated from the immigrant experiences of others, and
hence, from the “American” experience. Doing so contributes unnec-
essarily to the political currency of anti-immigrant rhetoric within the
Black community, and anti-slavery-descendant-Black racism among
more recent immigrants from all over the world.94
With regard to substantive immigration law, failure to locate slav-
ery within the terrain that provides the foundation of the contempo-
rary immigration system contributes to a failure to properly grasp one
of the most critical drivers of the development and underdevelop-
ment of the system since the founding and up to the present day—the
demand for ever more cheap and expendable labor, and the standard
racialization of, and racism against, that most expendable immigrant
labor pool.95 It renders impossible the necessary reckoning with the
pro-slavery origins of the system which continue to weigh heavily, if
invisibly and with a high degree of deniability, on the immigration
system continuously under construction in the present day, to the
92. See Francisco Valdes et al., Battles Waged, Won, and Lost: Critical Race Theory at the
Turn of the Millennium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTION, AND NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 1 (Fran-
cisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
93. See, e.g., Fogleman, supra note 15 and accompanying text. R
94. This includes African-heritage immigrants from other parts of the world, includ-
ing the Carribbean, and more recent immigrants from African countries, whose discord
with African Americans has been the subject of scholarly comment. See, e.g., Inniss, supra
note 5, at 119–32. R
95. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44
U.S.F. L. REV. 307 (2009) (demonstrating the “inherent racism at the center of ICE raids
and, for that matter, other ICE and Border Patrol operations,” and calling for a reconsider-
ation of these and other immigration policies as a consequence).
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benefit of corporate market interests, and to the detriment of domes-
tic and immigrant laborers alike.96
Great care should be taken by immigration scholars and teachers
so as not to replicate patterns of epistemological violence by render-
ing invisible, or minimizing, the horrors of the Black experience. In-
deed, such work challenges professors and instructors to broaden
their base of knowledge and to heighten their skills at handling the
often challenging reflections and responses of increasingly diverse stu-
dents of immigration law.97
E. General Political Concerns
1. Reparations
Sensitivity around the issue of categorizing enslavement as an in-
voluntary, forced, and presently illegal form of immigration may be
related to sensitivity regarding the potential for such a categorization
to be used as a support for redress—i.e., for some form of reparations
to the survivors of those enslaved. The claim for reparations is one for
which, despite the very real complications that would attend any effort
at crafting a reparations remedy for slavery, I admit more than a pass-
ing degree of interest, and even some sympathy.98 Whatever one’s
views of the merits of such claims, the possibility that such claims
might be bolstered in some ways, and weakened in others, should not
be a factor in considering the merits of promulgating the truth: that
slavery was in fact forced migration immigration upon which the colo-
nies, states, and nation depended mightily for their success through
most of the nation’s first three centuries.
2. Mobilization of Advocates and Immigrants in the Battle for
Immigrants’ Rights
We live in the midst of an immigration crisis of epic proportions.
Immigrant communities today, especially those hailing from south of
the Mexican border, face increasing criminalization, detention, and
threats of deportation, with fewer and fewer protections either in law
or process.99 For many lawyers and scholars of immigration law, and
for the most affected communities today, the issue of the treatment in
immigration history of the earliest arriving Americans from an amal-
96. Id. at 307.
97. See, e.g., Magee, Integral Critical Approach, supra note 1, at 277. R
98. See, e.g., Magee, The Master’s Tools, supra note 2. R
99. See Hing, Institutional Racism, supra note 95. R
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gam of countries in Africa might seem, well, rather like watering the
foundation of a building with a fire raging in the penthouse. This may
be especially true given that African Americans may be less than
acutely interested in or sympathetic to the concerns of the latest arriv-
ing immigrants, many of whom are seen as taking away formerly avail-
able jobs.100
Indeed, as many have noted, tensions do exist between and
among African Americans and the dominant immigrant populations
today.101 These tensions are real. Latino and Asian immigrants and
their advocates are rightly concerned about staying on messages that
maximize efforts to mobilize political groups and individuals to work
for changes to current policies. African Americans tend not to em-
brace these issues. Will discussing slavery as immigration help efforts
to reach the groups whose community members are most at risk in the
current anti-immigrant environment? Or is it simply a distraction
from the most pressing political objectives at hand? If handled well,
these discussions may help lay the foundation for greater cooperation
between African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans and in-
crease the chances that they might work together for their greater
freedom.
In addition, the compartmentalization of these issues—slavery
and segregation as “Black” issues, immigration as an Asian and Latino
issue—may have created a certain sense of “turf” or territory. Some
Asian and Latino advocates and their beneficiaries may resent a move
that might be seen as Blacks “horning in” on this topic and drawing
attention away from their more pressing modern day concerns. Some
may believe, in other words, that the White-Latino-Asian immigrant
paradigm or No-Black paradigm in immigration history must be de-
fended to keep the political pressures on sharpest point. Perhaps not
unrelated, there is the unfortunate reality of the complexities and pas-
sions of inter-minority group bias and racism.102 While broadening
the immigrant narrative to include greater appreciation for the immi-
grant struggle within the African American experience, Latino and
Asian American immigrants might find it easier to look upon African
Americans with something approaching brotherhood.
Surely, these and other political issues may negatively impact the
scholarly and public reception of the analysis and reframing project
100. See, e.g., Hing, Immigration Policies, supra note 31, at 237–38 (discussing Black con- R
cerns about labor competition from recent immigrants).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 1, at 1532–34; Innis, supra note 5, at 123–24. R
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proposed here. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that discussing these is-
sues with the ultimate objective of broadening the narrative reach of
immigration to include the African American experience has the po-
tential to bring together various communities who, in fact, as I hope I
have shown by the foregoing, have much more in common than the
standard narratives suggest.103
As I intend to develop more fully in subsequent work, and touch
upon briefly below, the ultimate value of this project goes far beyond
the reach of immigration law or race law scholarship and teaching.
The ultimate value of this project lies in its potential for restorative,
reconstructive justice, and healing of the national soul itself.
III. What Is To Be Done?
The foregoing analysis suggests that courses in immigration law
systematically fail to present and adequately address the relevant law
and history by which a significant portion of the present-day American
population arrived in this country. Consider measures that we might
adopt now to solve this problem and to better educate students and
practitioners of immigration law.
A. Revise Immigration Law Casebooks to Tell the Complete Story
One of the first and most important steps that immigration schol-
ars may make to correct this issue would be to revise the current immi-
gration law casebooks with this criticism in mind. Every relevant
casebook should include at least a short discussion of the history of
the forced migration of enslaved Africans to the colonies and early
American states as a significant component of the system of chattel
slavery. By relevant casebook, I mean those immigration law books
that seek either to survey immigration law generally (Legomsky,
Alienikoff, Boswell, etc.) or those which focus particularly on forced
migration immigration (presently perhaps only Martin, Alienikoff et
al.). By short discussion, I mean enough of an introduction to make
103. Even our cultural projects often fail to convey the connections between Black ex-
perience in America and the contemporary immigrant experience. For example, the 2004
film “A Day Without a Mexican” received widespread commentary and spawned sympa-
thetic coverage of Latino community issues, almost none of which referred to the 1963 off-
Broadway play, “A Day of Absence,” which originated the plot line used in “A Day Without
a Mexican,” but featured a small southern town grappling with the sudden disappearance
of all their “Negro” (or “niggra,” in the dialect) help. See Demetria McCain, ‘A Day Without
a Mexican’ De´ja` Vu: Douglass Ward Turner’s Black Theatre Unforgotten, http://
www.negroensemblecompany.org/index.cfm/bay/content.detail/contentid/26.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2009).
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the point that although chattel slavery included much more, it was a
system of forced migration involving the transportation of Africans
from various countries to the colonies and certain of the early Ameri-
can states, and, through the descendants of enslaved people ac-
counted for approximately one-third of the population of the United
States at the time of the Civil War. The point should be made that
while the highest law at the time condoned these pernicious practices
under a variety of Constitutional provisions, colonial and state laws
and policies, and now thoroughly debunked pseudo-scientific theo-
ries, we would and do today consider such trafficking illegal. In addi-
tion, the policies and imperatives of this system of imported,
racialized, and permanently enslaved labor continue to reverberate
through our immigration and citizenship law and policy today.
B. Encouraging and Conducting Further Scholarship on Chattel
Slavery and Immigration
More research should explore the relationship between the sys-
tem of chattel slavery, including the forced migration component,
and the development of immigration law and policy in the United
States. So far, the Neuman article stands virtually alone in looking at
the law and policy of chattel slavery for clues to the development of
federal immigration law. The historical records from the relevant pe-
riod are likely to be scant. This probability should underscore the im-
portance of undertaking work in this area sooner rather than later, so
as to head off additional loss of records.
In this connection, I note the potential utility of the recent slav-
ery disclosure ordinance movement. Through efforts of activists in
major cities and some states across the country, state and local legisla-
tures have passed laws requiring the disclosure of any relevant docu-
ments detailing the involvement in the slave trade of modern
corporations.104 The documents being uncovered and made public as
a result of these new laws may aid in accessing what information there
is on the importation of enslaved laborers, through the records of in-
surance companies, banks, and other industrial actors involved in the
trade. Such scholarship should be actively supported and encouraged.
104. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13810–13813 (2005); BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. ORDI-
NANCES ch. 13.96 (2009).
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C. Beyond Immigration and Race Law Scholarship
Bringing chattel slavery’s forced migration system into the immi-
gration law canon will have implications far beyond the classrooms in
which immigration law is taught. Chattel slavery left an indelible print
on the minds of the world. Through that system, the greatest model of
freedom the world had ever known sought explicitly to exclude a vital
portion of the world’s community (Africans) and its own society (Afri-
can Americans) from the community entitled to freedom. Grounded
by the self-serving proposition that some men and women were more
equal than others, and that membership in the political community
could be restricted to a privileged racial group, chattel slavery embed-
ded the policy of forcibly importing and migrating a racialized labor-
ing class, creating permanent reliance on that labor while denying
that class full participation in the democratic political community. Un-
packing chattel slavery—seeing it as a complex system which included,
as a significant part, a system of forced immigration with permanent
barriers to citizenship, whose legacies remain with us—helps us better
understand the dynamics that continue to animate immigration law
and policy and debated reforms today.
The long-term impact of such a reframing of the slavery experi-
ence cannot be known. For too long, the chasm between Blacks and
non-Blacks that undergirded and solidified slavery and segregation
has rested in the national memory and membrane, unchallenged by
deconstruction of all of its legal foundations. The virus of white
supremacy is a legacy of chattel slavery and the privileges of whiteness
inherent in racial restrictions on citizenship. It infects us all. By flesh-
ing out the experiences of early African Americans as forced migra-
tion immigrants, enslaved workers, and free people (some of whom
were exercising the right to vote at the time of the Constitution’s rati-
fication), we might begin the articulation of a new, more inclusive
narrative, one that understands this nation as having been strength-
ened by the contributions of people of diverse backgrounds from the
beginning. It also may assist in healing the rifts between Blacks who
trace their heritage to the era of chattel slavery, and more recent
Black immigrants from Africa, as we embrace the tattered connections
between Africa and America. Ultimately, such narrative reframing has
the potential to aid in the deep healing of the American psyche—and
that of whites, blacks, and every shade in between.
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Conclusion
Since the Founding, the United States has had at least three sig-
nificantly understated shadow objectives: the importation of immi-
grant workers under circumstances that may only be described as
radically racialized and exploitative; the maintenance of a permanent,
quasi-citizen-worker underclass; and the privileging of whites in the
immigration and naturalization process under circumstances that can
only be described as racist. Since the Founding, these shadow objec-
tives have found support and sustenance at both the federal and state
levels, most notably, through active and passive laws protecting and
regulating the importation and legal status of chattel slavery. These
public policy objectives, and their elaboration in the law and policy of
chattel slavery, are important to understanding U.S. immigration law
and policy today. Indeed, they are its troubling foundations, its bro-
ken heart, and transgressed soul.
